11/13/2022 0 Comments Irad kimhi philosophySo why assign them to my students? I do acknowledge that great art affords us access to distinctive aesthetic pleasures, but I don’t see it as my job to expose students to them. Initially, I accepted this rationale, but over the years I have come to question it: I don’t feel that reading novels has helped me navigate difficult decisions, or made me more empathetic. The (non-philosophy) professors in whose classes I read Homer and Tolstoy claimed for those texts a kind of moral authority, presenting novels as sources of personal ethical guidance. How did my syllabi wind up populated by so many novels, stories, poems and plays?Īs an undergraduate, I did not major in philosophy, perhaps in part because there were so few novels on the syllabi. I never formulated a plan to do so I never self-consciously aimed for interdisciplinarity. Looking back, I am surprised by how many pages of literature I have assigned over the years, far more than is the norm in college philosophy classes. In my class on courage, we read some Platonic dialogues, bits and pieces of Aristotelian treatises and all 24 books of Homer’s Iliad. I pair Plato’s Euthyphro with Sophocles’s Antigone, because they offer contrasting portraits of the clash between human and divine law. I teach Shakespeare’s Hamlet alongside Descartes’s Meditations: they are both about what it’s like to be trapped in one’s own head, looking for a way out. In my class on the philosophical puzzles surrounding self-creation, we read contemporary philosophical essays-and we also read novels by James Joyce and Elena Ferrante. But I also assign Karel Čapek’s play The Makropulos Affair, Leo Tolstoy’s novella The Death of Ivan Ilyich and Philip Larkin’s “Aubade”-a poem I strongly disagree with. Like all my classes, it is a philosophy class, so of course I assign the seminal philosophical texts on that topic. Ultimately, Kimhi's work elucidates the essential sameness of thinking and being that has exercised Western philosophy since its inception.-.I teach a class called “Death,” on the question of whether it is rational to be afraid of death. Self-consciousness, language, and logic are revealed to be but different sides of the same reality. As his argument progresses, Kimhi draws on the insights of historical figures such as Aristotle, Kant, and Wittgenstein to develop highly original accounts of topics that are of central importance to logic and philosophy more generally. In closing the gap that Frege opened, Kimhi shows that the two principles of non-contradiction-the ontological principle and the psychological principle-are in fact aspects of the very same capacity, differently manifested in thinking and being. Irad Kimhi's Thinking and Being marks a radical break with Frege's legacy in analytic philosophy, exposing the flaws of his approach and outlining a novel conception of judgment as a two-way capacity. ) the psychological version of the law of non-contradiction-that one cannot think a thought and its negation simultaneously. Yet by thus sundering the logical from the psychological, Frege was unable to explain certain fundamental logical truths, most notably (. Logic does not describe how we actually think, but only how we should. Opposing a long-standing orthodoxy of the Western philosophical tradition running from ancient Greek thought until the late nineteenth century, Frege argued that psychological laws of thought-those that explicate how we in fact think-must be distinguished from logical laws of thought-those that formulate and impose rational requirements on thinking.
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